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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION-State
v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Supreme Court made significant progress
toward resolving the uncertainty in the law on the admissibility of
medical expert opinion evidence in State v. Wade.' Since State v.
David,2 the rule in North Carolina was that an expert must base
his opinion testimony on either (1) "personal knowledge or obser-
vation" or (2) "a hypothetical question addressed to him, in which
the pertinent facts are assumed to be true, or rather, assumed to
be so found by the jury."3 After David several cases were decided
which liberalized the rule considerably4 while others held fast to
David.6 Without having overruled or reconciled any of these cases,
the Court appeared to have "a convenient precedent for the next
decision, whatever its tenor may be."6 The next decision, which fell
in line with and clarified the line of cases which more liberally al-
lowed admission of expert opinion evidence, was Wade.7 The Court
held that a medical expert may testify to the information on which
he based his opinion, even though obtained from the patient him-
self, provided the information is inherently reliable.
THE CASE
Wade was a criminal prosecution on three counts of second-
degree murder.8 Defendant did not deny having committed the
murders; instead, he offered in his defense a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. Defendant called an expert psychiatric witness 9
1. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
2. 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942).
3. Id. at 254, 22 S.E.2d at 640.
4. See State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974); Penland v.
Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 126, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
5. See State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Todd v. Watts, 269
N.C. 560, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
6. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136, at 250 (Supp. 1979).
7. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979); see 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 6, §
136, at 250 (commenting that Wade "has now, to a considerable extent, clarified
the rule").
8. 296 N.C. at 455, 251 S.E.2d at 407.
9. Id. at 456, 251 S.E.2d at 408.
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Dr. Eugene Douglas Maloney who examined defendant in the
months after the killings. Although the trial court admitted in evi-
dence Dr. Maloney's ultimate conclusion regarding defendant's
mental condition, it ruled inadmissible the expert's statements in-
dicating the basis of his ultimate conclusion. Specifically, the court
refused to allow testimony including defendant's statements and
behavior during examinations with Dr. Maloney subsequent to the
murders.10 The exclusion provided the basis for defendant's appeal
following his conviction on all three counts."
On appeal under Chapter 7A, section 27(a) of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes,12 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
manded the case for a new trial. s The Court cited numerous cases
but noted that none contained "any sort of universally applicable
rule"14 which could decide the case. From the "pattern of their
holdings," the Court synthesized its own two-part rule:
(1) A physician, as an expert witness, may give his opinion, in-
cluding a diagnosis, based either on personal knowledge or obser-
vation or on information supplied him by others, including the
patient, if such information is inherently reliable even though it is
not independently admissible into evidence. The opinion, of
course, may be based on information gained in both ways. (2) If
his opinion is admissible the expert may testify to the informa-
tion he relied on in forming it for the purpose of showing the ba-
sis of the opinion."
The Court found that Dr. Maloney's information was reliable even
though supplied by defendant in that (1) defendant was sent to
him "as a patient for treatment" and (2) Dr. Maloney "took into
account the entirety of what defendant said together with his own
interpretation and analysis of it and the objective manifestations
that accompanied it.''l6
10. Id. at 457, 251 S.E.2d at 409.
11. Id. at 458, 251 S.E.2d at 409.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1977) ("Appeals of right from the
courts of the trial division-(a) From a judgment of a superior court which in-
cludes a sentence of death or imprisonment for life, unless the judgment was
based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendre, appeal lies of right directly to the
Supreme Court").
13. 296 N.C. at 466, 251 S.E.2d at 414.
14. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
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BACKGROUND
Since attorneys first used experts to give their opinions, courts
carefully have limited the scope of their testimony.1 7 The tradi-
tional rule is that an expert may give his opinion either on the
basis of information obtained through personal observation or in
response to a properly formulated hypothetical question.18 Follow-
ing the traditional rule, an expert witness could not testify as to
his opinion if it were based on information he had received from a
third person, whether that be his patient, his colleague or someone
else. Nor could an expert witness offer testimony which was in any
way grounded on the opinion, inference or conclusion of another.19
The modern trend favors a more liberal admission of experts'
opinions.20 Illustrative of this view is the rule in federal courts as
17. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 10-
13 (2d ed. 1972).
18. Birmingham Amusement Co. v. Norris, 216 Ala. 138, 112 So. 633 (1927);
State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947); Krueger v. Friel, 330 Ill. App.
557, 71 N.E. 815 (1947); McDonald v. Robinson, 207 Iowa 1293, 224 N.W. 820
(1929); George v. Shannon, 92 Kan. 801, 142 P. 967 (1914); State v. Fishel, 228
Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962); Independent School Dist. No. 35 v. A. Hedenberg &
Co., 214 Minn. 82, 7 N.W.2d 511 (1943); De Donato v. Wells, 328 Mo. 448, 41
S.W.2d 184 (1931); Hornby v. State Life Ins. Co., 106 Neb. 575, 184 N.W. 84
(1921); Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 108 A.2d 616
(1954); Weibert v. Hanan, 202 N.Y. 328, 95 N.E. 688 (1911); State v. David, 222
N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942); Krenger v. Palmer, 9 Ohio App. 2d 9, 222 N.E.2d
651 (1966); Cobb v. Spokane, Pac. & S. Ry., 150 Or. 226, 44 P.2d 731 (1935);
Green v. Ashland Water Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77 N.W. 722 (1898).
19. Manufacturers' Accidental Indem. Co. v. Dorgan, 58 F. 945 (6th Cir.
1893); State v. Gevrey, 61 Ariz. 296, 148 P.2d 829 (1944); O'Brien v. Wallace, 137
Colo. 253, 324 P.2d 1028 (1958); Barker v. Lewis Storage & Transfer Co., 79 Conn.
342, 65 A. 143 (1906); Mt. Royal Cab Co. v. Dolan, 168 Md. 633, 179 A. 54 (1935);
Thompson v. Banker's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 128 Minn. 474, 151 N.W. 180 (1915);
Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S.W. 286 (1917); Stanley Co. v. Hercules Powder
Co., 16 N.J. 295, 108 A.2d 616 (1954); State v. Lichtman, 66 N.J. Super. 386, 169
A.2d 184 (1961); Zelenka v. Indus. Comm'n, 165 Ohio St. 587, 138 N.E.2d 667
(1956); Robertson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 195 Or. 668, 247 P.2d 217 (1952);
Kearner v. Charles S. Tanner Co., 31 R.I. 203, 76 A. 833 (1910).
20. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 688 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Physician's knowledge of symptoms based on hearsay of patients and
others. Here, again, the law cannot afford to stultify itself by refusing to
recognize, in testimonial rules, the safe and accepted practice of medical
science. When a physician examines a patient to ascertain his ailment
and to prescribe for it, a portion of his reasons for acting must be the
patient's own statements. To exclude testimony not wholly independent
of this foundation for opinion is, in strictness, to exclude almost always
19801
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stated in Federal Rule of Evidence 703:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opin-
ions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence [emphasis added]l"
By bringing the law of expert opinion evidence in line with the
practice of the "experts in the particular field, '2 2 the federal rule
sets it on a more rational foundation.
In North Carolina, some respected case authority supports a
restrictive attitude toward admission of expert testimony based on
other than personal observation or a proper hypothetical ques-
tion.23 While some North Carolina cases make inroads on the re-
24strictive view, other cases adhere to it.2" In Penland v. Bird Coal
medical testimony based on a personal examination.
E. CLEARY, supra note 17, §§ 14, 16.
21. FED. R. EVID. 703; see Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
22. FED. R. EVID. 703, Advisory Committee Note:
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information
from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements
by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians
and other doctors, hospital records, and X-rays. Most of them are admis-
sible in evidence, but only within expenditure of substantial time in pro-
ducing and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician
makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, ex-
pertly performed and subject to cross examination, ought to suffice for
judicial purposes.
23. See, e.g., Cogdill v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 279 N.C. 313,
182 S.E.2d 373 (1971) (an expert witness cannot base his opinion on hearsay testi-
mony); Ingram v. McCuiston, 261 N.C. 392, 134 S.E.2d 705 (1964); Seawell v.
Brame, 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1963) (opinion based on conversations with
plaintiff's wife, family members and former employee not allowed); State v. Alex-
ander, 179 N.C. 759, 765, 103 S.E. 383, 386 (1920) (a psychiatric witness was al-
lowed to give his opinion based on defendant-patient's statements during exami-
nation for treatment, but the statements were not admitted because they did "not
throw any light on the present condition or the past condition of the man's
mind").
24. See State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974); Penland v.
Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957)..
25. See State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Todd v. Watts,
269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967). Bock has been cited as being in agreement
with the restrictive view; but, as will be shown, it now has been reconciled by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Wade.
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Co.,26 a physician who had examined plaintiff for treatment of a
chest condition which plaintiff claimed entitled him to workmen's
compensation benefits from defendant gave his opinion as to the
nature and extent of the injuries "based on subjective statements
by the claimant. 2 7 On appeal from a plaintiff's verdict, the North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "[iln such cases
statements of an injured or deceased person, while not admissible
as evidence of the facts stated, may be testified to by the physician
to show the basis of his opinion." 0 Next, in Todd v. Watts,"9 the
North Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial on grounds that
an expert had been permitted to iestify where his opinion was
based entirely on subjective statements of the plaintiff.30 The ma-
jority reached its decision which seems diametrically opposed to
Penland without mentioning Penland. In the dissent Mr. Chief
Justice Parker argued strongly that Penland should control." The
then uncertain rule became even more confused with the decision
in State v. DeGregory.32 DeGregory, mentioning Penland" and
failing to mention Todd, held that an expert properly may base his
opinion "upon both his own personal examination and other infor-
mation contained in the patient's official hospital record."3 4 Within
a year State v. Bock 3 held the opinion testimony of an expert
inadmissible when based on out-of-court information received in
preparation for trial from the patient, his family and friends.3 6
This decision cited both Penland (for the distinction between a
physician examining a patient for treatment and one examining
him in preparation for trial) and Todd (for the general rule that
ordinarily an expert's opinion testimony may not be based on hear-
say or on information not included in a proper hypothetical ques-
tion).3 7 After Bock, although many cases had dealt with the admis-
26. 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
27. Id. at 30, 97 S.E.2d at 435.
28. Id. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.
29. 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
30. Id. at 420, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
31. Id. at 422, 152 S.E.2d at 452.
32. 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
33. Id. at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 801.
34. Id. at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802.
35. 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975).
36. Id. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
37. See State v. Bock, 228 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975). Bock has been
cited as being in contradiction to the liberal rules of Penland and DeGregory. 1
D. STANSBURY, supra note 6, § 136, at 250; Comment, Expert Medical Opinion
1980]
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sibility of expert opinion testimony, North Carolina still lacked a
clear and integrated statement of the rule.-s Whether a court chose
to follow the restrictive or liberal view, ample precedent was avail-
able to support its decision."
ANALYSIS
The importance of Wade is the North Carolina Supreme
Court's analysis of the development of the law concerning admis-
sion of expert opinion testimony in North Carolina and its drafting
of a clear and integrated statement of the rule. The narrow holding
of Wade, which adds nothing to Penland, is that a physician may
testify both to his expert opinion which is based in whole or in part
on statements made to him by his patient during an examination
for treatment and to the content of those statements on which he
bases his opinion, not as substantive evidence but to show the ba-
sis for his opinion.'0 The rule from Wade is broader: inherent relia-
bility of the information is the key to admissibility. "'
In forming this rule the Court relied heavily on Penland"" and
DeGregory,'4 reconciled Bock" and, regrettably, completely ig-
nored Todd. Bock, considered inconsistent with the forward-look-
ing Penland," is understood more easily under the Wade rule. The
Wade test of admissibility is "inherent reliability" ' and not sim-
ply a hearsay/non-hearsay distinction. Thus the inadmissibility of
the expert's opinion in Bock is not due merely to the fact that the
expert based his opinion on declarations made by defendant to the
expert out of court. The fact alone that defendant made such dec-
larations tells nothing of their inherent reliability. Rather, that is
Evidence in North Carolina-In Search of a Controlling Precedent, 8 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 267 (1977).
38. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412 (1979).
39. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 6, § 136, at 250 ("Since no case has been
overruled and no thorough judicial attempt to reconcile the various decisions has
been made, this writer can only conclude that there is at hand a convenient prece-
dent for the next decision, whatever its tenor may be").
40. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
41. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
42. Id. at 460, 251 S.E.2d at 410.
43. Id. at 461, 251 S.E.2d at 411.
44. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 411, 412.
45. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 6, § 136, at 250; Comment, Expert Medi-
cal Opinion Evidence in North Carolina-In Search of a Controlling Precedent,
8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 267 (1977).
46. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
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the beginning of analysis. One can read Bock as merely one step in
defining the more liberal Wade rule. True, Bock excluded opinion
testimony; however, the information on which the expert based his
testimony was gathered in a two-hour examination only two days
before the trial and in preparation for trial. Other information
was obtained from relatives and friends of the patient. 48 Neither
Penland nor DeGregory suggested that such information would be
a reliable basis for an expert's opinion. Under Wade that informa-
tion would seem to lack the inherent reliability necessary to serve
as a basis for an expert's admissible opinion.
CONCLUSION
Just what is inherently reliable remains to be defined by case
law. The rule from Penland and Wade is that a patient's state-
ments to a physician for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment
are inherently reliable.4'9 DeGregory holds that, generally, informa-
tion relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a patient supplied
by members of a physician's staff to the physician are inherently
reliable.50 Further, Wade and DeGregory both cite a federal case,
Birdsell v. United States,5 1 for the proposition that "[w]ith the in-
creased division of labor in modern medicine, the physician mak-
ing a diagnosis must necessarily rely on many observations and
tests performed by others and recorded by them; records sufficient
for diagnosis in the hospital ought to be enough for opinion testi-
mony in the courtroom. ' 52 Such a guideline provides an excellent
aid to North Carolina trial practitioners who have been troubled
by this area of law.
In any thorough analysis of Wade, note one caveat: the Wade
Court completely ignored Todd. Justice Exum's opinion in Wade
remains incomplete due to this small, but significant, matter. Al-
though the Wade rule seems authoritative on its face, Todd re-
mains as silent authoiity for the old rule. Barring legislative action,
the Court should address the inconsistency presented by Todd at
its earliest opportunity.
47. State v. Bock, 288 N.C. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 523 (1975).
48. Id. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
49. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979); Penland v. Bird Coal
Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
50. State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
51. 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
52. Id. at 779-80.
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From the conservative rule of David which denied the admis-
sion of expert opinion testimony based on information acquired
from others, the courts have staggered to the forward-looking stat-
ure. Wade represents one block laid toward a solid foundation for
a more clearly understood law of expert opinion testimony in
North Carolina courts. Elimination of the Todd contradiction
would complete the foundation and place North Carolina trial
practitioners on a solid footing.
James A. Haney
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